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We said things without meaning them, and we didn't carry them out, we
said over and over that we would equalize the rights of the Arabs to the
rights of the Jews in the city-empty talk... Never have we given them a
feeling of being equal before the law. [As mayor of Jerusalem, I] nurtured
nothing and built nothing [for the Arabs]. For Jewish Jerusalem I did
something in the past 25 years. For [Arab] East Jerusalem? Nothing!
What did I do? Nothing! Sidewalks? Nothing. Cultural Institutions? Not
one. Yes, we installed a sewage system for them and improved the water
supply. Do you know why? Do you think it was for their good, for their
welfare? Forget it! There were some cases of cholera there, and the Jews
were afraid that they would catch it, so we installed [a] sewage and a wa-
ter system against cholera. ..'
INTRODUCTION
If Teddy Kollek's ("Kollek") comments regarding the quality of
municipal services in Jerusalem seem excessive, this is because the
city has stood at the center of one of the twentieth century's most
tumultuous political conflicts. Particularly disturbing about the for-
mer Israeli mayor's candid admission is the fact that for over a quar-
ter-century he was not only "the most powerful actor in the city,"2
but was also viewed as a champion of Palestinian rights in Jerusa-
lem.3 Among other things, the glaring contradiction between his
reputation as a right-dealing moderate and his categorical acknowl-
edgment of the role he played in perpetuating inequity amongst Jeru-
salem's inhabitants is indicative of the wider manner in which Israeli
municipal laws and policies have been employed by the Jewish State
since it conquered Arab East Jerusalem thirty-two years ago.
Although Israeli municipal authorities in Jerusalem have publicly
1. Interview with Teddy Kollek, former Mayor of Jerusalem, in Israeli Daily
Ma'ariv (Oct. 10, 1990), quoted in DOCUMENTS ON JERUSALEM, at 115 (Palestin-
ian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs) (1996) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS ON JERUSALEM].
2. IRA SHARKANSKY, GOVERNING JERUSALEM: AGAIN ON THE WORLD'S
AGENDA 36 (1996) (noting Kollek was the most prominent actor in Jerusalem).
3. See id. at 142, 144 (explaining Kollek employed a network of contacts to
keep him informed about Palestinian concerns and to provide individual Palestini-
ans with personal contacts that could assist them with the local or national bu-
reaucracies); see also DOCUMENTS ON JERUSALEM, supra note 1, at 115.
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called for equality in treatment of the city's Jewish and Palestinian
inhabitants, since 1967, they have outwardly pursued policies that
have catered only to the former group. In turn, this has only served to
further exacerbate the deep divide that exists between the two com-
munities.4 As noted by Israeli Professor Ira Sharkansky, "[t]he city's
Jews are significantly better off than the Palestinians, and the [mu-
nicipal] policies for Jerusalem favor Jews over non-Jews."' If this is
in fact the case, than it behooves one to examine the factors which
have allowed the situation to develop.
Without any doubt, the principle determinant behind the disparity
in treatment between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem lies in the Israeli
government's long-held official policy that the city, "whole and
united," is the exclusive capital of the Jewish State and must "remain
forever under Israel's sovereignty."' This assertion would not be ex-
traordinary were it not for the fact that before Israel's armed forces
conquered East Jerusalem in 1967 that sector of the city was exclu-
sively populated by indigenous Palestinians,' many of whom were
part of the wave of approximately 60,000 Palestinians forced to flea
West Jerusalem in 1948. 8 To this day, Jerusalem remains central to
the collective narrative and identity of the Palestinian people-colo-
nized, dispossessed, occupied-who have, for their part, always re-
garded the city as the natural capital of a future Palestinian State, and
4. See, e.g., The Status of Jerusalem, U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, at 25 (1997) (explaining that while the
current Guidelines of the Government of the State of Israel stipulate that the gov-
ernment will allocate special resources to build and improve municipal services for
Jewish and Arab residents, since 1967 the State has "constructed dwelling space
for 70,000 Jewish families" in East Jerusalem "and only 555 dwelling units for its
Palestinian residents"); see also The Likud Part': Guidelines of the Government of
Israel (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://wvww.likud.org.il/policy/govguide.html>
[hereinafter Guidelines].
5. See SHARKANSKY, supra note 2, at 17 (noting the economic element to the
conflict between Jerusalem's communities).
6. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at pt. 11, arts. 1, 3 (noting that the government
will prevent any actions that counter Israel's exclusive sovereignty over Jerusa-
lem).
7. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 25 (explaining that in 1967
there were no Jews in the eastern part of Jerusalem and in July 1993 there were
160,000 Jews to 155,000 Palestinians).
8. See The Status ofJerusalemn, supra note 4, at 6.
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have therefore refused to recognize Israeli sovereignty over it. In
support of the Palestinian position, the international community has
overwhelmingly and unequivocally stated that East Jerusalem is Oc-
cupied Territory and, as such, any assertion of Israeli sovereignty, in
or over it, is contrary to well-established principles of international
law.9
Despite this fact, however, the State of Israel has remained wed-
ded to its conviction that all of Jerusalem-both the predominately
Arab eastern sector and the largely Jewish western sector-must re-
main under its exclusive control."' To further this national policy, the
Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem has waged an extensive campaign
to entrench the Jewish State's hold on East Jerusalem through the
promulgation of a number of municipal policies and land use plan-
ning laws carefully designed to alter the demographic and geo-
graphic character of the city.
This Essay will attempt to illustrate the efficacy with which these
laws and policies have been employed by Israeli municipal authori-
ties to create a situation in East Jerusalem that will not be reversed in
the future." To this end, a brief examination of the history of Israel's
control over East Jerusalem will be undertaken, followed by a
broader analysis of Israeli municipal policy and activity in the city.
Among other things, it is the intent of this Essay to serve as a re-
minder of the enormous impact Israeli municipal and land use plan-
ning laws and policies have had on the natural development of local
Palestinian space in East Jerusalem. This point should also be con-
sidered in light of the fact that Israel and the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization ("PLO") have committed themselves in good-faith to ne-
gotiate the "final status" of Jerusalem under the framework of the
current Oslo peace process."
9. See id. at 29-41; see also The Question of the Observance of the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949 in Gaza and the West Bank Including Jerusalem Oc-
cupied by Israel in June 1967, U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People, at 1 (1979).
10. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at pt. II, art. 3 (stating the government will
thwart any attempt to undermine the unity of Jerusalem).
11. See John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 780
(1996).
12. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on
1042 [15:1039
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I. BACKGROUND
A. ISRAELI LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EAST JERUSALEM
SINCE 1967
East Jerusalem was captured by the Israeli armed forces when they
conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the Arab-Israeli war of
June 1967 (See Map I).' Immediately following the hostilities,
Moshe Dayan, then Israeli Defense Minister, proclaimed that "[t]he
Israeli Defense Forces have liberated Jerusalem. We have reunited
the torn city, the capital of Israel ... never to part from it again."'"
Thereafter, on June 27, 1967, the Israeli government passed the
Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law,
which provided for the extension of its law, jurisdiction, and admini-
Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (entered
into force Oct. 13, 1993) [hereinafter DOP]. The Oslo Peace Process emerged out
of the "historic" pronouncement of the DOP, concluded on Sept. 13, 1993, be-
tween Israel and the PLO, in Washington, D.C. See id. Under the DOP, Israel and
the PLO agreed to bring the conflict between their peoples to an end through a se-
ries of 'interim negotiations' and 'agreements' in preparation for a permanent set-
tlement of the conflict that was to be reached no later than five years after the
signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Id. Although permanent status negotia-
tions were initially opened on May 4, 1996, they were almost immediately there-
after brought to a standstill by the Israeli government. Id. On September 13, 1999,
six years to the day after the signing of the DOP, the permanent status negotiations
were re-opened by the parties, but have yet to produce any concrete results. Id. To
date, several interim agreements have been concluded. See, e.g., Protocol on Eco-
nomic Relations, Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area, Apr. 29, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 696 (forming Annex IV of the
Gaza-Jericho agreement); Israel Palestine Liberation Organization: Agreement on
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622; Israel-Palestine
Liberation Organization: Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities,
Aug. 29, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 455; Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551; Is-
rael-Palestine Liberation Organization: Agreement on the Temporary International
Presence in the City of Hebron, Jan. 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 547; Israel-Palestine Lib-
eration Organization: Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Jan. 17,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 650; Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Wye River Memo-
randum, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251; Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization:
Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, 38 I.L.M. 1465.
13. See Quigley, supra note 11, at 772-74 (discussing Israel's taking of the
West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt).
14. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 14.
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stration to newly captured Arab East Jerusalem.'" The next day the
Israeli government enacted the Municipalities Ordinance (Amend-
ment No. 6) Law, which authorized the Interior Minster to unilater-
ally enlarge the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem "at his dis-
cretion and without an inquiry" into any impact it may have on the
indigenous Palestinian populace. 6 Armed with this broad power, the
minister proceeded to enlarge East Jerusalem's 6.5 square kilometer
land area to encompass 71 square kilometers of expropriated Pales-
tinian land (See Map II).17 Subsequently, the Israeli government
amalgamated the newly expanded East Jerusalem with West Jerusa-
lem,'8 and, on June 29, 1967, the Assistant Israeli Commander of Je-
rusalem, Yaacov Salman, issued an order dissolving the twelve-
member elected Arab Municipal Council of East Jerusalem, includ-
ing its duly elected mayor, Mr. Rawhi al-Khatib.' 9
In the years that followed, both the General Assembly and Secu-
rity Council of the United Nations ("U.N.") issued numerous resolu-
tions declaring Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem to be contrary
to international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.20 For
instance, in Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967, the General As-
sembly declared all "measures taken by Israel to change the status of
15. 21 L.S.I. 75 (1967).
16. 21 L.S.I. 75 (1967).
17. See ALLISON B. HODGKINS, THE JUDAIZATION OF JERUSALEM 6 (Palestin-
ian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs) (1996) (stating that
the purpose of this exception of municipal Jerusalem was to include the maximum
contiguous territory with the minimum non-Jewish population into Jerusalem's
boundaries).
18. See Quigley, supra note 11, at 775.
19. See DOCUMENTS ON JERUSALEM, supra note 1, at 100 (setting forth the or-
der dissolving the Jerusalem municipality).
20. See Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (ratified by Israel, 6 July 1981). See
generally' S.C. Res. 267, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1
(1969); S.C. Res. 298, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/10338/Rev.I (1971);
S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/14113 (1980); G.A. Res.
35/169E, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/35/L.42/Rev.1 (1980); G.A. Res.
41/162C, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/41/L.45, addendum pt. 1 (1986);
G.A. Res. 49/36B, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1995); G.A. Res.
ES-10, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emer. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.5/Rev.I (1999).
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the City" to be "invalid," and in Resolution 252 of May 21, 1968,
the Security Council proclaimed that "all legislative and administra-
tive measures and actions taken by Israel ... which tend to change
the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that
status."' Notwithstanding these clear expressions of international
opposition, however, Israeli authorities continued to implement poli-
cies designed to integrate Arab East Jerusalem with Jewish West Je-
rusalem, remaining unequivocally of the opinion that this process
"was irreversible and not negotiable."-'
The high-water mark of Israeli legislative attempts to consolidate
this "unification" policy came with the passing of the so-called "Ba-
sic Law" on Jerusalem on July 30, 1980.24 According to this law,
"united" Jerusalem was declared to be the eternal capital of the State
of Israel. Much like its reaction following the passing of the Law and
Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law and the Mu-
nicipalities Ordinance (Amendment No. 6) Law in 1967, the interna-
tional community reacted quickly to condemn the State of Israel
through Resolution 478.'
In this Resolution, the U.N. Security Council affirmed the princi-
ple of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and
the continued applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to
"Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in-
cluding Jerusalem" [emphasis added]. It fturther declared that "the
enactment of the 'basic law' by Israel" constituted "a violation of
international law" and was "null and void and must be rescinded
forthvith. '27 Again, the State of Israel chose to ignore this clear
21. See G.A. Res. 2253 (ES-V), U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/6789 (1967).
22. See S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/8590/Rev.2 (1968)
(calling upon Israel to rescind measures already taken and to desist from taking
any further action that would change Jerusalem's status).
23. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 15.
24. See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel 34 L.S.I. 209 (1980).
25. See S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. S, 14113 (1980)
(censuring Israel's enactment of its "basic law" on Jerusalem and the refusal to
comply with relevant security council resolutions).
26. See Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
27. See S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/ 14113 (Aug. 19,
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demonstration of international resolve and continued to pursue poli-
cies aimed at annexing occupied East Jerusalem to its larger Jerusa-
lem Municipality. Contrary to what many hoped, the signing of the
Oslo peace accords did not dampen Israel's insistence on maintain-
ing its program of forced demographic and geographic re-
engineering of the city. On the contrary, despite its agreement to re-
frain from initiating "any step that will change the status of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip" during the interim phase of negotiations with
the PLO,28 since 1993, Israeli policies aimed at altering the status of
Jerusalem have been pursued at an unprecedented pace and scope,
resulting in even further displacement and dispossession of the city's
Palestinian inhabitants. This situation has impelled the General As-
sembly to continue its condemnation of Israel's annexation policies
in Jerusalem as "illegal," "null and void," and having "no validity
whatsoever."'2 9
As will be illustrated below, "the strategies for ensuring" the Jew-
ish State's national/political objectives in Jerusalem were, and have
continued to be, "developed and enacted on the municipal level."'"
For this reason, it is important to examine Israeli municipal govern-
1980) (expressing concern over the enactment of a "basic law" in the Knesset de-
claring a change in the character and statute of Jerusalem).
28. See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551, at art. 31(7) (stating that
the two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, and its
integrity and status will be preserved during the interim period).
29. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/87A, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/49
(1995); G.A. Res. 50/22A, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50/L.37, adden-
dum pt.1 (1995); G.A. Res. 51/27, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/49
(1996); G.A. Res. ES-10/2, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emer. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-
10/2 (1997) (discussing illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the
rest of the occupied Palestinian territory); G.A. Res. ES-10/3, U.N. GAOR, 10th
Emergency Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/3 (1997); G.A. Res. ES-10/4,
U.N. GAOR, 10th Emer. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/4 (1997) (reiterating the
demands made in resolutions ES-10/2 and ES-10/3); G.A. Res. 52/53, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/53 (1997); G.A. Res. ES-10/5, U.N.
GAOR, 10th Emer. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/5 (1998) (reaffirming its reso-
lutions ES-10/2, ES-10/3, and ES-10/4); G.A. Res. ES-10, U.N. GAOR, 10th
Emer. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ES-1O/L.5/Rev. 1 (1999) (reiterating its condemnation of
the failure of the Israeli government to comply with the provisions of resolutions
ES-10/2, ES-10/3, ES-10/4, and ES-1015).
30. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 15 (asserting that the municipality is the
"engine driving the incorporation of East Jerusalem into Israel proper").
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ment policies in East Jerusalem.
B. ISRAELI MUNICIPAL POLICY IN EAST JERUSALEM
Since 1967, Israeli municipal policy in East Jerusalem "has been
dominated by one overriding purpose: to secure and maintain exclu-
sive Israeli sovereignty over all parts of the city."" To this end, mu-
nicipal governance is primarily concerned with the dual policy goals
of achieving a decisive demographic superiority of Jews over Pales-
tinians in the city32-historically, a central tenet of Zionist colonial
policy for the whole of Palestine-and maintaining its geographic
integrity as one single and indivisible administrative unit."
During his twenty-six year tenure as mayor, Kollek emerged as the
chief architect of the Jewish State's municipal policy in Jerusalem.
According to Allison Hodgkins ("Hodgkins"), "the Kollek munici-
pality pursued planning policies intended to cut Greater Jerusalem
[i.e. expanded East Jerusalem] off from the West Bank and facilitate
its easy annexation into Israel proper." It was under his administra-
tion that the long-held Israeli policies of Jewish settlement and land
expropriation were cemented to transform Palestinian East Jerusalem
into "a city that would largely be[come] Jewish."'" Because "demog-
raphy was a key element in the perceived imbalance between Jewish
and 'non-Jewish' residents of the city," Kollek continually insisted
that "making the city more conducive to Jewish settlement" would be
the only effective policy course if the broader national goal of en-
trenching exclusive Israeli sovereignty was to be realized.-6 With this
policy in mind, "Kollek era planners set [out] to fill" expanded East
Jerusalem "with Jewish facts" in the form of exclusively Jewish set-
tlements built, in the main, on illegally expropriated Palestinian
land.37 Invariably, "Kollek's municipality" pursued this policy so that
31. See id. at 20 (explaining Israel's policy goals for Jerusalem).
32. See SHARKANSKY, supra note 2, at 21.
33. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 19.
34. See id. at 15.
35. See SHARKANSKY, supra note 2, at 21.
36. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 17.
37. See id. at 17-18.
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"united" Jerusalem would "be difficult to take apart" in the future.tm
For the most part, throughout Kollek's term, he was concerned
with publicizing his municipal policies as "benevolent and demo-
cratic. ' 9 As part of this strategy, it was Kollek who coined the idea
that Jerusalem was an "ethnic and cultural mosaic" belonging
equally to all of its inhabitants, both Jews and Arabs.40 As noted ear-
lier, this image of Jerusalem was designed to present the Israeli mu-
nicipality as being truly concerned with the well being of the city's
Palestinian inhabitants. Nevertheless, as pointed out by former Israeli
municipal planner Sara Kaminker-and as betrayed by Kollek's very
own words quoted at the outset of this Essay-the "mosaic" epithet
was little more than "a beautiful marketing ploy for selling segrega-
tion."4'
The current Israeli mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert ("Olmert"),
ousted Kollek from office in 1993 but continued to effectuate the
policies developed over the course of Kollek's long career. Thus,
from the very outset of his administration, Olmert declared his intent
to "make things happen on the ground to ensure the city will remain
under Israeli sovereignty for eternity." '2 Supported unconditionally
by the national governments of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, former Prime Ministers Shimon Peres and Benjamin
Netanyahu, and the current Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Olmert has
unabashedly pursued the same dual policy objectives in East Jerusa-
lem that were established by his predecessor: namely, achieving
demographic superiority and maintaining geographic integrity. As
noted by former Israeli municipal planner Yisrael Kimchi, "there is
no tangible difference between Kollek and Olmert" with respect to
their policies on East Jerusalem.4 ' Both desired to sever the city from
its natural West Bank hinterland, and at the same time infuse it with
38. See SHARKANSKY, supra note 2, at 142.
39. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 18.
40. See KHADER ABUSWAY ET AL., SIGNED, SEALED, DELIVERED: ISRAELI
SETTLEMENT AND THE PEACE PROCESS 25 (1997) (analyzing Kollek's municipal
policies).
4 1. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 18.
42. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, JERUSALEM: ONE CITY, THREE FAITHS 418
(1996) (noting that Olmert has no need to woo Israeli liberals).
43. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 20.
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Israeli-Jewish settlers to manipulate its demographic character in a
manner favorable to the Jewish State.
In sum, it must be understood that since taking control of East Je-
rusalem in 1967, successive Israeli municipal administrations in Je-
rusalem have sought to entrench their hold on the city through the
promulgation of a "broad series of policy initiatives" designed "to
create irreversible facts on the ground."" With respect to the Israeli
government's current commitment to negotiate the final status of Je-
rusalem under the framework of the Oslo peace process, the Israeli
Deputy Defense Minister recently expressed his opinion that the
"consolidation of the existing territorial continuity [of the city]
through [the] expansion of settlements as well as [the] construction
of roads, tunnels and bridges and further land acquisition" must all
"be presented in the future negotiations as a geographic fact" if Israel
is to retain exclusive control over the city. ' 5 Although briefly alluded
to above, the following section will explore in greater detail the prin-
ciple methods by which Israeli municipal authorities in Jerusalem
have pursued this policy of creating afait accompli in the city.
II. FACTS ON THE GROUND: ISRAELI MUNICIPAL
ACTIVITY IN EAST JERUSALEM
Since 1967, Israeli municipal planners in East Jerusalem have de-
vised and implemented a host of mechanisms designed to manipulate
land use and demography to ensure that the city remains under ex-
clusive Israeli control in the future. As previously noted, the interna-
tional community has declared Israel's use of these mechanisms to
be illegal under international law.4 The following is a brief exami-
nation of just six of these methods, and the practical impact they
have had on the indigenous Palestinian residents of occupied East Je-
rusalem.
44. See id. at 21.
45. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 23.
46. See S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doe. S/8590/Rev. 2
(1968); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/14113 (1980) (demon-
strating that the U.N. and the international community have consistently con-
demned Israel's efforts to retain control of East Jerusalem).
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A. EXPROPRIATION OF PALESTINIAN LAND
It will be recalled that immediately following the conquest of East
Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli authorities unilaterally expanded the mu-
nicipal boundaries of the occupied city from 6.5 square kilometers to
71 square kilometers-an increase of approximately eleven times the
city's original size (See Map II).47 "[T]hese new boundaries became
the framework within which the Israeli government would alter the
existing layout of the city ... in an attempt to physically secure their
control over" it.48 As early as 1968, Israeli municipal authorities rec-
ognized that if expanded Arab East Jerusalem was to be converted
into a Jewish city, the expropriation of Palestinian land would be im-
perative. According to the Jerusalem Master Plan of 1968:
The majority of the [expanded] municipal land reserves that are amenable
to [Israeli-Jewish] development are in private [Palestinian] hands. The ef-
fective development of the city will require the expropriation of substan-
tial areas [emphasis added].4 9
With this strategic principle in mind, Israeli municipal planning
committees set out to develop and effectuate a mass expropriation
policy aimed at divesting Palestinian owners of vast tracts of land in
expanded East Jerusalem for exclusive Jewish use."' Over the course
of Israel's thirty-two year occupation of the city, this policy has
taken shape in five separate stages and accounted for the expropria-
tion of over 60,000 dunums of Palestinian land without compensa-
tion.' Altogether, this amounts to approximately 86.5 percent of the
land area of East Jerusalem as defined by the city's expanded mu-
47. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 6 (documenting the expansion of Jerusa-
lem's municipal boundaries in 1967).
48. See id. at 22.
49. See ETAN FELNER, A POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION: LAND EXPROPRIATION,
PLANNING, AND BUILDING IN EAST JERUSALEM 30 (1995), quoting I JERUSALEM
MASTER PLAN (1968).
50. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 22-23 (documenting the strategic zoning
and planning practices of Israel to block Palestinian development).
51. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 22-23 (recounting the history
of Israel's expropriation of Palestinian land; one dunum is approximately equal to
one thousand square meters or 0.274 acres).
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nicipal boundaries.
Because Israel emerged the victor in the June 1967 war, it could
have conceivably acquired all of East Jerusalem's land through force
of arms. However, as pointed out by Hodgkins, "the desire to foster
international legitimacy for their claims prompted [the Israelis] to
use what they defined as legal methods of transferring Arab lands to
Jewish ownership."53 Although the majority of these "legal" methods
were orders issued by local military commanders, Israeli municipal
authorities in East Jerusalem relied quite heavily on these methods to
acquire Palestinian land for exclusive Jewish use. For example,
Military Order No. 70 (1967) allows the authorities to declare any
portion of East Jerusalem land a "closed military area," thereby pro-
hibiting anyone other than state authorities from making use of it.'"
Likewise, Military Order No. 150 (1968) allows a body known as the
Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property to expropriate land belonging
to Palestinians who were not recorded in the official East Jerusalem
census conducted by Israel following the 1967 war. 5 Under this
military order, once land is declared as belonging to an "absentee," it
is reverted to the Custodian of Absentee Property (i.e. the state).
Similarly, Military Order 321 (1968) affords authorities the right to
expropriate any tract of land required for "public" use," which is
"almost always synonymous with exclusive Jewish use" in the con-
text of land expropriation. ' 7 Again, it is important to emphasize that
although in most cases the expropriating authority is usually a state
actor (as opposed to a municipal one), the Israeli municipality of Je-
rusalem is regularly given the power to dispose of expropriated Pal-
estinian property as it wishes. This implied authority is consistent
with the general Israeli policy that once the state acquires land it
automatically becomes the "inalienable property of the Jewish peo-
52. See id.
53. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 25.




57. See id. at 23.
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pie" and cannot be owned or leased by a non-Jew."
On June 11, 1998, in conjunction with national authorities, the Is-
raeli municipality of Jerusalem approved a proposal to formalize
what it calls the "Greater Jerusalem Plan."59 Under this plan, the cur-
rent municipal boundaries of the city are to be expanded to include
"approximately 10 percent of the land area of the West Bank" (See
Map 11). 60 Invariably, tens of thousands of dunums of more Pales-
tinian land will be expropriated to impose more "facts on the
ground" that will transform the demographic and geographic char-
acter of the area even further, thereby consolidating the Jewish
State's exclusive "sovereignty" over the whole of the city.
B. THE IMPOSITION OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS
Since the city's occupation began, "the key element" of Israeli
municipal planning in East Jerusalem "has been the construction of
more than 15 [Jewish] settlements in and around the boundaries ille-
58. See Atef Kubrusi, An Economic Assessment of Total Palestinian Losses, in
SAMI HADAWI, PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND LOSSES IN 1948: A COMPREHENSIVE
STUDY 117-188 (1998) (documenting a consistent pattern of Zionist policies by
Israel preventing the owning and leasing of land by non-Jews). Article 3 of the
Constitution of the Jewish Agency provides that:
(d) [I]and is to be acquired as Jewish property and subject to the provisions of
Article 10 of this Agreement, the title to the lands acquired is to be taken in
the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held
as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.
Id. (emphasis added).
Likewise, Article 23 of the lease provisions of the Jewish National Fund provide,
in part that:
[T]he lessee undertakes [that]... the holding shall never be held by any but a
Jew. If the holder, being a Jew, leaves as his heir a non-Jew, the Fund shall
obtain the right of restitution. Prior to the enforcement of the right of restitu-
tion, the Fund must give the heir three months notice, within which period the
heir shall transfer his rights to a Jew, otherwise the Fund may enforce the
right of restitution and the heir may not oppose such enforcement.
Id. (emphasis added).
59. See generally MUNA HAMZEH-MUHAISEN, Preempting Jerusalem, 3
JERUSALEM QUARTERLY FILE (1999) (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.jqf-
jerusalem.org/joumal/l 999/jqf3/muhaisen.html>.
60. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 23.
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gally established in 1967.,, 6' Driven by the desire to maintain the
geographic integrity of Jerusalem as a "united" city under exclusive
Israeli control, these settlements are strategically arranged in loca-
tions around the northern, eastern, and southern outskirts of East Je-
rusalem to dismember it from its surrounding West Bank hinterland
(See Map III). Benignly referred to by Israeli municipal planners as
"neighborhoods," these exclusively Jewish settlements were con-
structed on expropriated Palestinian land, "completely alter[ing] the
[geographic and demographic] landscape of East Jerusalem.'""
Similar to the method used to expropriate Palestinian land, the
construction of Jewish settlements by Israeli municipal authorities
was largely accomplished in five distinct stages.' Today, major set-
tlements exist at Ramat Eshkol, French Hill, Ma'aleh Dafna, Mount
Scopus, Ramot, East Talpiot, Gilo, Neve Ya'acov, and Pisgat
Ze'ev.6' Together, these and other smaller settlements account for
approximately 180,000 Jewish settlers" and comprise what is known
as the "inner-ring" settlements encircling Arab East Jerusalem.'
With the Israeli municipality's recent decision to begin construction
of massive new settlements at Har Homa (indigenously known as
Jabal Abu-Ghneim) and Ramat Shu'fat, the number of Jewish settlers
in expanded East Jerusalem is projected to reach approximately
220,000 by the end of this year.6 The Har Homa settlement is of
particular significance because it represents the final "southern link"
in the chain of inner-ring settlements surrounding the city (See Map
61. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 22.
62. See id. at 37.
63. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 22-23 (documenting the stra-
tegic construction of Jewish settlements).
64. See id. (discussing a report indicating that a majority of the Palestinian
property in East Jerusalem and its surroundings were seized in five stages).
65. See id. at 23 (stating the number of Jewish settlers expected by the end of
1995).
66. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 39 (stating that the number of Jewish set-
tlers was expected to expand by the end of the century after the status negotiations
were completed).
67. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 23 (stating that the number of
Jewish settlers was expected to expand by the end of the century).
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III).6"
The imposition of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem has had a
tremendous impact on the demographic composition of the city. "
"Whereas in 1967 there were no Jews in East Jerusalem, in July
1993, the Government announced that it had achieved a Jewish ma-
jority there (160,000 Jews to 155,000 Palestinians)". 70 Since the es-
tablishment of Israel's Inter-ministerial Committee to Examine the
Rate of Development in Jerusalem in 1973,71 it has been a policy ob-
jective of successive Israeli municipal planners to maintain the
population ratio in Jerusalem at approximately 78 percent Jews to 22
percent Palestinians.72 Moreover, the recent approval of the Greater
Jerusalem Plan will only serve to increase Jewish numbers in the ex-
panded city, as the scheme calls for the absorption of four of the
largest settlements in the Jerusalem area-Giv'at Ze'ev in the north,
Ma'ale Adumim in the east, and Betar and Efrat in the south, collec-
tively known as the "outer-ring" settlements (See Map III). 7'
To make rapid occupancy of the settlements possible, Israeli mu-
nicipal planners and other governmental authorities have devised a
number of substantial economic incentives aimed at attracting Jewish
citizens to establish roots in East Jerusalem. 4 For example, new
Jewish settlers are exempt from paying the arnona, the principal mu-
nicipal tax, for a period of five years from the date of settlement, af-
ter which time they are assessed at a reduced rate.7' Furthermore,
68. See id. (discussing the United Nations' inability to stop the construction of
Har Homa settlement, which created great concern over the future of Arab East Je-
rusalem).
69. See id. (arguing that the increasing number of Jewish settlers in Arab
neighborhoods has disturbed Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem).
70. See id. at 25.
71. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 46 (stating that the committee determined
that it was important for Jerusalem's future to ensure "the relative proportion of
Jews and Arabs [in Jerusalem] as it was at the end of 1972").
72. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 25 (stating that after 1967,
there was an increase of Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem).
73. See HAMZEH-MUHAISEN, supra note 59 (discussing the Israeli govern-
ment's plan of settlement expansion and land confiscation).
74. See ABUSWAY ET AL., supra note 40, at 38 (discussing Israeli settlement
strategies to attract Jewish settlers to East Jerusalem).
75. S. Kaminker, "Housing and Community Development Through Land Rec-
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since 1967, over 70,000 Jewish settler families in the city have been
provided with subsidized housing by the national government. "
Similarly, in 1990, under the title of "On the Way to a Jewish Ma-
jority in Jerusalem," the government approved a plan that offered a
100 percent guarantee against losses incurred by contractors willing
to construct settlements for new Jewish immigrants from the former
Soviet Union."
In what has been described as a "classic example of racial gerry-
mandering,"78 the highly efficient manner in which Israeli municipal
planners have constructed and populated illegal Jewish settlements in
occupied East Jerusalem has been the single most important factor in
the realization of the broader policy goal of ensuring that the city re-
mains under exclusive Israeli control in the future.
C. ZONING PALESTINIAN LANDS AS "GREEN AREAS"
In addition to the expropriation methods outlined above, Israeli
municipal officials are also exercising their planning authority to im-
pose severe restrictions on Palestinian land use to eventually transfer
such land to Jewish ownership.79 Since 1967, one of the most popular
forms of this type of land use restriction has been the so-called
"green area" zoning designation.0 Under this planning scheme, Is-
raeli municipal authorities may zone any unexpropriated tract of Pal-
estinian land as a "green area," effectively restricting it to agricul-
lamation" in M. Kothari and J. Abu-Shakrah, Planned Dispossession: Palestinians,
East Jerusalem and the Right to a Place to Live (Geneva: COHRE, Occasional Pa-
per No. 4, 1995) at 8.
76. See id. at 9.
77. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 48 (stating that in 1990, the Ministerial
Immigration Committee objected to plans to provide housing for Soviet Unionimmigrants in Jerusalem).
78. See id. at 6.
79. See R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 217 (In-
stitute for Palestine Studies, 1985) (discussing how the Antiquities Department has
extensive powers to impose severe restrictions on land use based on archeological
considerations).
80. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 26 (discussing Israel's tools for blocking
Palestinian land development).
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tural and other forms of agrarian use. Although these zoned areas
are theoretically "to be planted and to serve as public open spaces...
in reality this designation is used to block Palestinian development"
of lands desired by the municipality for future Jewish settlement."2
The idea is to ensure that such lands remain free and clear of any
physical impediments, such as Arab homes or buildings, which
would make Jewish settlement construction difficult if and when ex-
propriation decisions are finally made. In this manner, Israeli mu-
nicipal planners have stunted the natural growth and development of
East Jerusalem's Palestinian community to acquire more land to
build future Jewish settlements.
The following two examples serve as good illustrations of how
this process actually takes shape on the ground. In 1968, approxi-
mately 2000 dunums of Palestinian owned land in the East Jerusalem
village of Shu'fat were designated as a "green area." Under this des-
ignation, the land was sowed with cypress seedlings and left undis-
turbed for twenty-six years. In 1994, the restrictive zoning was "sud-
denly changed" by the municipal government, which subsequently
issued expropriation orders for it and proceeded to authorize the con-
struction of Reches Shufaat, a new settlement for religious Jews."
Similarly, in 1968, a further 2000 dunums of Palestinian land at Jabal
Abu-Ghneim on the southern outskirts of East Jerusalem were zoned
as a "green area" by the Israeli municipality. Like the lands in
Shu'fat, these tracts were left undeveloped for over two decades.
Subsequently, in 1991, Israeli municipal authorities informed the
Palestinian owners of the lifted "green area" designation and that the
land would be expropriated to begin construction of the Jewish set-
tlement of Har Homa (See Map III).1
4
81. See id. (defining "green areas" as Palestinian land where any development
other than agriculture is strictly prohibited).
82. See id. at 27.
83. See id. (discussing how zoning laws changed and how, as a result, a new
neighborhood for religious Jews was built).
84. See id. (stating that some tracts of land between Bethlehem and Jerusalem
were zoned as green areas but were later made available for municipality construc-
tion).
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D. TowN PLANNING SCHEMES
The Town Planning Scheme ("TPS") is another effective tool
utilized by Israeli municipal authorities to restrict Palestinian devel-
opment in East Jerusalem." As in most urban centers, TPSs (or
documents similar to them) are required by the municipality in order
to "supervise the development of an area in accordance with its zon-
ing designation, expected population growth, housing needs, and in-
frastructure requirements. ' '16 In Jerusalem, it is impossible to acquire
a development permit for an area that does not have a TPS approved
by the Israeli municipal authorities. 87 The municipality's overarching
desire to cement Israel's exclusive control over the occupied city
dominates the TPS procedure in East Jerusalem because the main
purpose of the process is to ensure that areas are developed in accor-
dance with "the overall planning goals of the municipality." As
such, the needs of its Palestinian residents are simply not figured into
planning considerations."
For instance, because the TPS is an expensive ten-step process that
"requires a high level of coordination and cooperation with the mu-
nicipal authorities," 9 (See Appendix) the Israeli government regu-
larly provides Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem with substantial re-
sources to put TPSs together, including the allocation of funds and
the contracting of urban planners and architects.9' With respect to de-
velopment proposals for East Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods, how-
ever, "all costs and resources needed to draw up a TPS fall on the
85. See Y. Stein, The Quiet Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Je-
rusalem Palestinians (Jerusalem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights
in the Occupied Territories, 1997) at 8 (discussing how planning schemes restrict
the development of Palestinian neighborhoods).
86. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 29.
87. See id. (discussing how the TPS is used as a means of restricting develop-
ment in Palestinian areas).
88. See id. at 30.
89. See Stein, supra note 85, at 8 (stating that planning schemes are primarily
based on national and political considerations rather than on Palestinian needs).
90. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 29.
91. See id. at 30 (discussing how the Israeli government has the responsibility
for re-parceling land).
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Palestinians themselves." 92 As a result, the TPS process has proved to
be an economic and bureaucratic obstacle for Palestinians, while at
the same time "an efficient and successful exercise in urban plan-
ning" for Jewish settlers. 93 This is highlighted by the fact that over
the past twenty-one years, Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusa-
lem have received approval for only thirteen TPSs.9 4
Even where approved, the Israeli municipality has "invariably de-
layed and/or dramatically minimized TPSs for Palestinian neighbor-
hoods." 9' For instance, although municipal authorities are legally re-
quired to issue a decision on TPSs within three years of an
application, it took thirteen years for the Palestinian town of Shu'fat
to be approved in 1996. Additionally, the plan called for the con-
struction of 17,000 housing units, however, under the directive of Is-
raeli Interior Minster Eli Suissa, the plan was eventually pared down
to a mere 500 units.9 6 Likewise, "[p]lanning procedures which began
in Beit Safafa in 1977 also took 13 years to reach approval in 1990,"
plans "in Abu Tor took 12 years and a plan submitted in 1987 for
Ras al-Amud has not [yet] received final approval."97
Not surprisingly, the TPS process profoundly impacts Palestinian
growth and development in East Jerusalem, most notably with re-
spect to housing shortages. As noted by a U.N. report, "since 1967
Israel has constructed dwelling space for 70,000 Jewish families on
expropriated Arab land in East Jerusalem, and only 555 dwelling
units for its Palestinian residents." 8 The same report noted that oner-
ous municipal policies "and land use restrictions resulted in a situa-
tion in which at least 21,000 Palestinian families were practically
homeless and had to live in tents and hovels, or share with other
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id., at 31 (stating that since 1978, only 13 plans "have been approved
which have any bearing on Palestinian neighborhoods").
95. See id.
96. See id. (noting the decrease in Palestinian housing units from 17,000 to 500
units).
97. See id. at 31-32.
98. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 25.
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families." When confronted with statistics similar to these during an
examination of a TPS for the Palestinian villages of Um Tuba and
Sur Baher, Israeli municipal sub-committee member, Elinor Bara-
zaki, summed up the opinion of the municipality succinctly:
There is a government decision to maintain the proportion between the
Arab [minority] and Jewish [majority] populations in the city... The only
way to cope with that ratio is through the housing potential. The growth
potential is defined on this basis and the [housing] capacity is a function
of that here as well.' °
E. DEMOLITION OF PALESTINIAN HOMES
Because of the Israeli municipality's massive expropriation cam-
paigns, onerous land use restrictions, and discriminatory planning
schemes, many Palestinian landowners are forced to build houses
without permits only to later face demolition orders.'"' Knowing that
its policies have directly caused the overcrowding and severe hous-
ing shortages in Palestinian neighborhoods, Israeli municipal
authorities in East Jerusalem have observed a policy of demolishing
Palestinian homes constructed without the required building permit
or built on land not zoned for residential use (i.e. "green areas").W'
:
What makes this practice most unpalatable, aside from its obvious
human rights implications, is the fact that the Israeli municipality
publicizes its activity as redressing the consequences of "illegal"
Palestinian construction, despite the fact that it is an agent of a state
that is illegally occupying Arab East Jerusalem. "' This political
whitewash is what has allowed municipal officials to destroy an av-
erage of fifty East Jerusalem Palestinian homes per year between
99. See id.
100. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 34 (alterations added) (quoting Minutes
of the Subcommittee Meeting for Planning and Building, Feb. 22, 1993).
101. See HAMZEH-MUHAISEN, supra note 59 (discussing the effects of restnc-
tive zoning laws on the Palestinian population).
102. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 35 (reporting on the frequency of housing
demolitions in East Jerusalem).
103. See M. Klein "Only Jewish Homes Destroy Peace" JERUSALE\M POST
[NORTH AMERICAN EDITION] (Apr. 16, 1999) at 11; see also SHARKANSKY, supra
note 2, at 104 (citing issues surrounding Palestinian construction).
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1986 and 1996.'0 Moreover, the Oslo peace process has not put an
end to this practice. In fact, between 1993 and 1995, the Israeli mu-
nicipality destroyed ninety-seven Palestinian homes,'05 and recently
Olmert launched a massive campaign to demolish the homes of
2,600 East Jerusalem Palestinians who, according to his records,
have built "illegally.'
06
F. REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY RIGHTS
Along with mechanisms designed to alter the geo-physical status
of Jerusalem, since 1967, the Israeli Interior Ministry has actively
sought to reduce the number of Palestinians in Jerusalem by em-
ploying "a series of discriminatory bureaucratic methods" that effec-
tively operate to deport them from the city.1
0 7
Following Israel's conquest and annexation of the city, "Palestini-
ans living within the municipal boundaries, as subsequently ex-
panded, were classified as permanent residents of the State"'"-not
as Israeli citizens-under the Law of Entry into Israel (1952).",9
Thus, although it was the Jewish State that "entered" the city through
military conquest, Israeli law treats Palestinian Jerusalemites as
though they are "immigrants residing in their homes pursuant to the
beneficence of Israel and not by right.""' According to Regulation
11 (c) of the Entry into Israel Regulations, "a permanent residency
permit expires if the holder leaves Israel and settles in another coun-
try.""' Regulation 1 A of the same regulations, provides that "a per-
son will be considered to have settled in a foreign country if he or
she: (1) lived for more than seven years in a foreign country; (2) re-
104. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 35 (highlighting the number of' housing
demolitions in East Jerusalem).
105. See id. (reporting housing demolition statistics).
106. See HAMZEH-MUHAISEN, supra note 59 (emphasizing the Palestinian
housing dilemma in Jerusalem).
107. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 51 (explaining measures taken by Israel in
order to maintain the desired demographic ratio); see also Stein, supra note 85.
108. See The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4, at 26.
109. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 52 (examining Israeli policy on Palestin-
ian residency).
110. See Stein, supra note 85, at 7.
III. Seeid. at6.
1060 [15:1039
2000] ISRAELIMUNICIPAL POLICY IN EAST JERUSALEM
ceived the status of permanent resident in a foreign country; or (3)
became a citizen of a foreign country."" 2 It is important to note that,
as far as Palestinian residency rights are concerned, Israeli authorities
consider the West Bank and Gaza Strip (not including annexed East
Jerusalem) to be a "foreign country."' Through the use of these
regulations, thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites who have lived,
worked, or studied abroad, including in the West Bank or Gaza Strip,
have suffered revocation of their residency rights and expulsion from
the country without any right of appeal."'
Since the signing of the DOP, the Israeli Interior Ministry has in-
tensified its efforts to revoke Palestinian residency rights in Jerusa-
lem.'15 The principal method is through the implementation of the so-
called "center of life" policy. According to this policy, a Palestinian
Jerusalemite's residency status may be revoked if the Interior Min-
ister determines that the individual's "center of life" has moved "out-
side of Israel."" 6 The significance of this policy, which has never of-
ficially been made known to Palestinian Jerusalemites,"' lies in the
fact that it applies even where the resident meets all of the requisite
criteria under Regulation 1 A of the Entry into Israel Regulations.
Thus, "even if the stay outside of Jerusalem [is] less than seven years
and the person [has] not become a citizen or permanent resident of
another country,""8 their residency status may be revoked. This new
policy is particularly harsh because it also applies retroactively and
irrespective of the present residency situation of the individual in
question. Thus, proof of "center of life" in the past does not grant
residency rights to an applicant if his or her current "center of life" is
not within the city, and proof of a current "center of life" in Jerusa-
lem does not grant residency rights to an applicant if, for any period
of time in the past, his or her "center of life" was outside of the
112. See id.
113. See id. at 14.
114. See id. at 17.
115. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 53 (commenting on the increase in the
number of revoked Palestinian residency permits since the commencement of the
Oslo peace process).
116. See Stein, supra note 85, at 14.
117. See id. at 13.
118. See id.
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city." 9 Moreover, because Israeli authorities routinely apply an ex-
cessively high threshold with respect to the "center of life" standard,
more often than not, Palestinian Jerusalemites are unable to prove to
the Interior Minister that they in fact live in Jerusalem, and are,
therefore, stripped of their right to remain there. 2
Finally, because permanent residency rights do not automatically
extend to the family of permanent residents, "Palestinian Jerusale-
mites marrying spouses from the rest of the Occupied Territories [or
elsewhere] must apply for Family Reunification to legally reside to-
gether in Jerusalem. ' ' 2' Much like the process of gaining approval on
a TPS for a Palestinian neighborhood, applications for family reuni-
fication notoriously take several years to process before a decision is
reached.22 As a result, Palestinian families are usually left with two
alternatives: they may either live separately with the unrealistic hope
that their application will be accepted swiftly or they may leave the
city to live together. Obviously, if they choose to leave, the family
will loose its residency rights in Jerusalem by virtue of Israel's
"center of life" policy. 23
Since its conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli authorities
have revoked the residency rights of over 4,000 Palestinian fami-
lies.'24 Because of the severe housing shortage affecting Palestinians
in Jerusalem-itself a consequence of Israeli settlement and dis-
criminatory land use policies-nearly 12,000 Palestinian Jerusale-
mites currently live outside of the municipal boundaries of the city,
and are, therefore, subject to having their residency rights revoked.'2 '
As with Israel's policies on land confiscation, Jewish settlement, and
Palestinian development, its systematic campaign of revoking Pales-
tinian residency rights in Jerusalem has been carefully designed to
119. See id. at 20.
120. See id..
121. HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 52-53 (alteration added).
122. See Stein, supra note 85, at 9.
123. See id. at 10.
124. See BADIL, Confiscation of Palestinian Jerusalem LD. Cards (visited Feb.
24, 1999) <http://www.badil.org/resident/resstats.htm>.
125. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 54 (discussing the "center of life" re-
quirement).
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alter the demographic composition of the city in an attempt to pres-
ent a Jewish majority there as a fait accompli in any future final
status negotiation with the PLO.
CONCLUSION
Since its "annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli gov-
ernment has adopted a policy of systematic and deliberate discrimi-
nation against the Palestinian population in [East] Jerusalem. ' '
Driven by the overarching national policy of securing and maintain-
ing exclusive Israeli control over the occupied city, Israeli municipal
authorities have implemented a process designed to impose exclu-
sively Jewish "facts on the ground" to re-engineer the city's demo-
graphic and geographic character in the Jewish State's favor. For the
better part of a quarter-century, these policies were forged under the
watchful eye of Kollek who viewed his role as "seeing to the Jewish
majority" in the city.'27 Today, Omert, who has perfected these poli-
cies, repeatedly insists that Jerusalem must remain "the eternal" and
"united" capital of Israel. 28
Despite the fact that the international community has in no uncer-
tain terms condemned Israeli actions in the city as constituting egre-
gious violations of international law, municipal authorities continue
to pursue planning policies designed to transform the city into the
Jewish State's "undivided" capital. Some of the principal tools util-
ized by municipal authorities in this regard have been the wholesale
expropriation of vast tracts of Palestinian land, the imposition of ille-
gal Jewish settlements on that land, discriminatory zoning and plan-
ning processes, the demolition of "illegally" built Palestinian homes,
and the revocation of Palestinian residency rights in the city.
Through its control over expropriated Palestinian lands in a
grossly expanded East Jerusalem, Israeli municipal authorities have
been able to impose a barrage of illegal Jewish settlements in the
126. See Stein, supra note 85, at 8.
127. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 16 (noting that in a meeting of the Jeru-
salem Municipality Council on January 25, 1988, Kollek made the following re-
vealing statement about his job as mayor of the city: "I am seeing to the Jewish
majority... that is why we are here, to see to [the Jewish majority].").
128. See DOCUMENTS ON JERUSALEM, supra note 1, at 130 (quoting Olmert's
opening address to the "Jerusalem 3000" celebration).
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area that have served national goals on two key levels. First, by in-
serting hundreds of thousands of Jewish citizens of Israel into occu-
pied East Jerusalem, the demographic facts on the ground have been
altered to the point that the city has in fact become numerically, po-
litically, and economically dominated by a 77 percent Jewish settler
majority. Second, through the strategic placement of these settle-
ments in the form of two rings encircling East Jerusalem's northern,
eastern, and southern outskirts, the city has been geographically sev-
ered from its natural West Bank hinterland, thereby helping to fa-
cilitate its physical annexation into Jewish West Jerusalem.
The onerous "green area" zoning designation and the discrimina-
tory TPS procedure complement the foregoing. Since 1967, these re-
strictive land-use planning mechanisms have proved very helpful in
curtailing the development of unexpropriated Palestinian lands de-
sired by the Israeli municipality for future Jewish settlement. Be-
cause these mechanisms keep Palestinian lands undeveloped until the
time is "ripe" for municipal expropriation, 2 9 Palestinian residents of
East Jerusalem suffer from a severe overpopulation and housing cri-
sis. In an effort to cope, Palestinians have been forced to develop
their lands without proper municipal permits, and are thereby subject
to the possibility of having their "illegally" built homes demolished
by municipal authorities.
Finally, in yet another scheme concocted to alter the indigenous
Palestinian character of East Jerusalem, Israeli municipal planners
have launched a bureaucratic campaign to strip Palestinian inhabi-
tants of the city of their rights to live there. Since 1967, thousands of
Palestinian Jerusalemites have had their residency rights revoked
through the use of obscure and onerous administrative laws that,
needless to say, do not apply to Jews.
In essence, Israeli municipal planners in East Jerusalem, over the
course of the past thirty-two years, have engaged in a concerted ef-
fort to establish afait accompli in the city such that any future ques-
tion as to its actual status as the "capital" of the Jewish State would
be rendered completely academic. For a variety of political reasons, a
discussion of which lies beyond the scope of this Essay, these mu-
129. See HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 26 (identifying land expropriation as a
tool used by Israel to prevent Palestinians from settling in East Jerusalem).
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nicipal planners have been extremely successful in achieving their
goal. With the Oslo peace process recently put back on track after
months of postponement and delay, it remains to be seen how Israel
and the PLO intend to approach the question of negotiating the "final
status" of Jerusalem. If anything is for certain, the facts on the
ground in the city illustrate quite clearly that the question may have
been settled long before the parties ever chose to meet at the negoti-
ating table.
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
MAP I. PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN
1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM 3 '
130. All copyrights reserved by the United Nations Cartographic Section. See
Map 3. Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, inchding Jerusalem, Map No.
3243 Rev. 4, United Nations (June 1997) in The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4.
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MAP II. JERUSALEM OCCUPIED AND EXPANDED
BY ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967'
131. All copyrights reserved by the United Nations Cartographic Section. See
Map 4. Jerusalem occupied and expanded by Israel in June 1967, Map No. 3640
Rev. 3, United Nations (June 1997) in The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4.
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132. All copyrights reserved by the United Nations Cartographic Section. See
Map 5. Israeli settlements in and around Jerusalem, Map No. 3996, United Na-
tions (June 1997) in The Status of Jerusalem, supra note 4.
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APPENDIX A
THE TEN STEP PROCEDURE OF ToWN PLANNING SCHEMES (TPS)'
The local TPS goes through the following stages before its final ap-
proval:
1. The Local Planning and Building Committee decides that a TPS
is required for a certain area and entrusts its preparation to ex-
perts;
2. The plan is conveyed to the Local Planning and Building Com-
mittee, which either recommends or rejects its deposition;
3. The plan, if approved by the Local Planning and Building Com-
mittee, goes to the District Planning and Building Committee for
deposition;
4. Publication of the plan in the Official Gazette, in three daily
newspapers and on the public bulletin boards in the particular
neighborhoods. A two-month window is allowed for submission
of objections to the District Committee;
5. Hearing of objections by the Local Committee;
6. First discussion of the objections by the District Committee;
7. Second discussion of the objections by the District Committee;
8. Approval of the plan by the Local Committee and the District
Committee;
9. The TPS is approved by the Minister of the Interior;
10. Publication of notice of the approval and granting of legal valid-
ity to the plan. Upon final approval the TPS will be published in
local newspapers, the Official Gazette and posted on neighbor-
hood bulletin boards.
133. Adapted from HODGKINS, supra note 17, at 81.
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